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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
I. FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT TAKES A HARD LOOK AT DISCLO-
SURE REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Washington Trollers Association v. Kreps,1 the Ninth 
Circuit held that the summary of information utilized by the Pa-
cific Fishery Management Council (the Council) in arriving at 
the Fishery Management Plan's specifications must be sufficient 
to enable an interested party to intelligently comment on those 
specifications. I 
On May 13, 1977, the plaintiff, Washington Trollers Associ-
ation, challenged regulations implementing the 1977 Pacific 
Salmon Fishery Management Plan.' Plaintiff requested either a 
preliminary injunction or summary judgment, arguing that the 
regulations issued by the Secretary of Commerce were invalid. 
The district court denied the action.· In June 1977, the Ninth 
Circuit denied a motion to stay the application of the regula-
tions, and the 1977 Plan went into effect.' Plaintiff then filed the 
current motion for summary judgement following a second 
amended complaint challenging the 1978 Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Plan (the Plan).' Plaintiff contended that the Plan did 
not conform to the requirements of the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976 (the Act)? in that it failed to ade-
quately describe the methodology used to arrive at the Plan pro-
1. 645 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Karlton, D.J., sitting by designation, and Poole, J., diBBenting). 
2. Id. at 686. 
3. Washington Trollers Ass'n v. Kreps, 466 F. Supp. 309, 311 (W.D. Wash. 1979). 
4.Id. 
5.Id. 
6.Id. 
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976). Section 1853(a)(3) of the Act provides that fishery 
management plans must "assess and specify the present and probable future condition 
of, and the maximum sustainable yield and optimum yield from, the fishery, and include 
a summary of the information utilized in making such specification." Id. § 1853(a)(3). 
155 
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jections and recommendations. Plaintiff claimed that this failure 
prevented informed criticism' and, therefore, should invalidate 
the regulations promulgated to implement the Plan." The defen-
dant Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) sought to establish 
the validity of the regulations. 
The district court determined that the type and amount of 
information required by the Act had been phrased in such vague 
and open-ended terms that it would always be possible to find 
some omission in the information supplied by the Secretary.lo 
The court then required the defendant to make a good faith ef-
fort to supply available information regarding the choice of man-
agement options.ll As long as such an effort appeared to have 
been made, the court would uphold the Secretary's findings. II 
The district court reasoned that because the plaintiff failed to 
point to any information which the Secretary withheld or to any 
significant subject which the Secretary had ignored, the Plan 
was valid. 11 
On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's entry of 
summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that there was a material 
dispute regarding the availability of the information used in the 
Council's Plan, and that the Plan did not conform to the provi-
sions of the Act.lf The Council relied upon computerized analy-
sis systems and had described neither the methodology nor the 
data used to arrive at projections and recommendations of the 
Plan. 11 Plaintiff contended that without such a description, the 
information was not readily available and therefore precluded 
interested parties from meaningful comment. II The Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the district court's standard of good faith effort, 
8. One purpose of the Act is to "enable. . . interested persons to participate in and 
advise on the establishment and administration of such (fishery] plans .... " ld. § 
180l(b)(5)(A). 
9. The Secretary must find the Plan to be consistent with national standards and 
other applicable provisions of law. rd. §§ 1854(a).1854(b), 1855(c). Thus, the existence of 
a plan conforming to the statutory prerequisites is a condition to the Secretary's author-
ity to promulgate regulations. Washington Trollers Ass'n v. KrepI, 466 F. Supp. at 312. 
10. 466 F. Supp. at 313. 
11.ld. 
12.ld. 
13. ld. at 314. 
14. 645 F.2d at 685. See note 7 8upro for pertinent text of the statute. 
15. 645 F.2d at 685. 
16.ld. 
2
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reversed the entry of summary judgment, and ordered further 
proceedings to resolve the factual dispute. It 
B. BACKGROUND 
Implementing the Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
Congress declared that the purpose of the Act was to take 
immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources 
oft'the coasts of the United States, 1. taking into account the best 
scientific information available,18 while being "responsive to the 
needs of interested and affected states and citizens.'tao To do so, 
the Act created eight Regional Fishery Management Councils.·1 
Each council is charged with the development of that region's 
Fishery Management Plan.·· The objective of the Plan is to pre-
vent over-fis~g, yet achieve the optimum yield" of each 
fishery.·· 
Once this plan has been developed, it must be made availa-
17. ld. at 686. 
18. The preamble of the Act provides: "It is therefore declared to be the purposes of 
the Congreai in this chapter-(1) to take immediate action to conaerve and manage the 
fishery resources found oft'the couts of the United States .•.. " 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) 
(1976). 
19. ld. § 1801(c)(3) provides: "It is further declared to be the policy of the Congress 
in this chapter- .•. (3) to assure that the national fishery conservation and manage-
ment program utilizes, and is bued upon, the best scientific information available 
" 
20.ld. 
21. ld. § 1852(a) provides: "There shall be established •.. eight Regional Fishery 
Management Councils . . . . Each Council shall reflect the expertise and interest of the 
several conatituent States in the ocean area over which such Council is granted 
authority." 
22. "Each Council shall ... (1) prepare and submit to the Secretary a fishery man-
agement plan with respect to each fishery within ita geographical area of authority 
.... " ld. § 1852(h)(1). 
23. Optimum yield u used in the Act means: 
[T)he amount of fish-
(A) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the 
Nation, with particular reference to food production and rec-
reational opportunities; and 
(B) which is prescribed u such on the buis of the maxi-
mum sustainable yield from such fishery, u modified by any 
relevant economic, social, or ecological factor. 
ld. § 1802(18). 
24. Fishery is defined u "(A) one or more stocks of fish which can be treated u a 
unit for the purposes of conservation and management and which are identified on the 
buis of geographical, scientific, technical, recreational, and economic characteristics; and 
(B) any fishing for such stocks." ld. § 1802(7). 
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ble for public comment.:I& One of the stated policies of the Act is 
that it shall take into account the social and economic needs of 
the region it serves by allowing interested parties to comment on 
and participate in the establishment of these plans.16 The Coun-
cil is to conduct public hearings to facilitate such comment17 
and, as part of the required contents of the Plan, include a sum-
mary of the information used in specifying optimum yields." 
The Secretary then receives the Plan and notifies the Council of 
her approval or disapproval. III If approved, the Secretary 
promulgates such regulations as needed to implement the 
Plan.80 These regulations must conform to the national stan-
dards as set forth in the Act,1l and are subject to judicial review 
as authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act.1I 
25. "Each Council shall ... (3) conduct public hearings ... so as to allow all inter-
ested persons an opportunity to be heard in the development of fishery management 
plans .... " Id. § 1852(h)(3). 
26. The preamble of the Act states: 
It is therefore declared to be the purposes of the Congress 
in this chapter-
(5) to establish Regional Fishery Management Councils to 
prepare, monitor, and revise such plans under circumstances 
(A) which will enable the States, the fishing Industry, con-
sumer and environmental organizationa, and other interested 
persons to participate in, and advise on, the establishment and 
administration of such plans and (B) which take into account 
the social and economic needs of the States . . . • 
Id. § 1801(b)(5). 
27. Id. § 1852(h)(3). For the text of the statute, see note 25 ,upra. 
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3) (1976). For the text of § 1853(a)(3), see note 7 supra.. 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1976). 
30. Id. § 1855(a). 
31. The Secretary is charged with reviewing "any fishery management plan, and any 
amendment to any such plan, prepared by any Council and submitted to him to deter-
mine whether it is consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this 
chapter, and any other applicable law." Id. § 1854(b). 
32. "Regulations promulgated by the Secretary . . . shall be subject to judicial re-
view to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of title 5; ... except 
that. .. (2) the appropriate court shall only set aside any such regulation on a ground 
specified in section 706(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D) of such title." Id. § 1855(d). 
The Administrative Procedure Act provides: 
To the extent necessary to decision . . . , the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the mean-
ing or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The re-
viewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be-
4
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The Hard Look Doctrine 
While decisions regarding any fishery management regula-
tion are subject to the review outlined by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, that standard of review has recently been inter-
preted to allow a degree of scrutiny enabling the courts to 
closely examme agency decisions.as The "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act" has given 
way to a "hard look" doctrine which does not presume the valid-
ity of an agency decision." Judge Leventhal attempted to delin-
eate this new rule of interpretation in Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. FCC," by suggesting that whenever a court senses 
"danger signals" which may indicate an agency has neglected to 
take a " 'hard look' at the salient problems"" affecting its deci-
sion making, the court may scrutinize the evidence to "penetrate 
the underlying decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the 
agency has exercised a reasoned discretion with reasons that do 
not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent."" 
The trend facilitating review of agency decisions was fur-
thered in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckleshaus.'t The 
court there stated that an agency must make available to all in-
terested parties data on which it bases it regulations to insure 
that the agency has fulfilled its "continuing duty to take a hard 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordanC!l with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privi. 
lege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by 
law; 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). 
33. Warner, Finamore & Bean, Practical Application of the Conservation Aspects 
of the Fishery Conservation and ManaBement Act, 5 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REv. 30, 65 
(1981). 
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). See note 32 supra for text of the pertinent section. See 
Benerally S. BEYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 289 
(1979). 
35. Warner, Finamore & Bean, supra note 33, at 65. 
36. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cu. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
37. ld. at 851. 
38. ld. at 850. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 385 F.2d 
678 (D.C. Cir. 1967». 
39. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cu. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). 
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look at the problems involved in its regulatory task."40 The 
Portland Cement court held that the purpose of an agency is not 
to promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or data 
known only to the agency.41 United States v. Nova Scotia Food 
Products, which cited Portland Cement with approval, estab-
lished a standard for disclosure of information when the pro-
posed rule is based on a scientific determination." The Nova 
Scotia court reasoned that unless the agency discloses the scien-
tific data it relies upon in its determination, criticism of the 
methodology is meaningless, and the nondisclosure effectively 
eliminates meaningful comment.4I 
C. COURT'S REASONING 
The Majority 
The majority focused on the overall policies of Congress as 
announced in the Act. U Quoting from the Act, the court stated 
that one objective is to "enable the States, the fishing industry, 
consumer and environmental organizations, and other interested 
persons to participate in, and advise on, the establishment and 
administration of such [fishery] plans ... !'411 
The court then determined that to effectuate this goal, in-
terested parties must be informed in order to make meaningful 
comments.411 The Ninth Circuit relied upon Portland Cemenf4' 
40. Id. at 394. 
41. Id. at 393. Plaintiff (Portland Cement Association) repudiated defendant's (En-
vironmental Protection Agency) test data, upon which defendant's regulations were 
based. Defendant did not respond, but promulgated the regulations unchanged, exactly 
as they were before plaintiff's comment. The court held: "It is not consonant with the 
purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate rules on the baais of inadequate data 
or on data that [to a) critical degree, is known only to the agency." Id. 
42. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). Defendants argued that unlet18 the Food and Drug 
Administration specified the scientific data relied upon in making Its regulations, a criti-
cism of the methodology would be useleSB. The court held that "(wlhen the basis for a 
proposed rule is a scientific decision, the scientific material [supporting) the rule should 
be exposed to the view of interested parties for their comment. . . . To suppreSB mean-
ingful comment by failure to disclose the basic data relied upon is akin to rejecting com-
ment altogether." Id. at 252. 
43.Id. 
44. 645 F.2d at 686. 
45. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5)(A)(1976». 
46. 645 F.2d at 686. 
47. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). 
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and Nova Scotia Food Products48 for the proposition that an ad-
ministrative agency cannot base its regulatory decisions upon 
material known only to the agency itself. 
Because any comment regarding the Council's determina-
tion of maximum sustainable yield or optimum yield would be 
based upon a summary of information the Council used,"8 the 
Ninth Circuit found that the summary must meet at least some 
minimum standard of reasonable disclosure. It "must therefore 
provide information sufficient to enable an interested or affected 
party to comment intelligently on those specifications."lIo 
Moreover, the court required any information mentioned in 
the summary to be reasonably available to an interested party.1I1 
The court noted that only information central to the decision, 
not all raw data or information, need be supplied. III Such infor-
mation can simply be incorporated by reference in order to allow 
an interested party a means of discerning how the Council made 
its determination. III 
Since the parties disagreed on what the court believed to be 
material issues of fact,1I4 and those issues remained unresolved 
by the district court's decision, summary judgment had been im-
properly granted.1II The court decided that, because there was no 
way to determine whether means for meaningful comment had 
been available, further proceedings to resolve the factual dis-
putes were in order. M 
48. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
49. Under § 1853(a)(3) of the Act, every fishery management plan must include a 
summary which lists present and probable future conditions, and optimum and maxi-
mum sustainable yields. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3)(1976). Without this summary, therefore, 
an interested party has no basis for comment on th08e specifications. 
50. 645 F.2d at 686. 
51.1d. 
52. Id. at 686 n.2. 
53. Id. at 686. 
54. Id. at 686-87. There remained disagreement on how available a description of 
the computer methodology actually wes, if the data used was set forth in the Plan, and 
how many computer models were actually used to formulate the Plan. 
55. Id. at 687. FED. R.CIV. P. 56(c) states in pertinent part that "summary judg-
ment shall be proper only . . . when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." 
56. 645 F.2d at 687. 
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The Dissent 
Judge Poole, dissenting, argued that the Secretary had com-
plied with the statutorily required summary.1I7 He agreed with 
the majority's basic premise, that when the Secretary is required 
to disclose information, the public should be provided a reasona-
ble means of access. III He disagreed, however, with the majority's 
interpretation of the term "summary" as used in the Act.llt The 
dissent maintained it was not up to the court to mandate abso-
lute access to all raw data used to arrive at fishery yield 
specifications. eo 
The dissent found that Congress has "drawn a line of re-
quired access," and the court lacked the power to relocate that 
line.61 The dissent also looked to the intent of Congress, and . 
found that some limitations had been placed on the disclosure 
required of the Secretary;e. all the information essential to the 
Plan's formulation need not be available publicly. Judge Poole 
argued that Congress anticipated that meaningful comment 
could be facilitated without all of the raw data used in making 
the Plan's determinations.ell He stated it was not up to the court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature." 
The dissent relied on recent Ninth Circuit decisions which 
57.1d. 
58. 1d. at 688. 
59. 1d. at 687-88. 
60. 1d. at 688-89. 
61. 1d. at 688. 
62. 1d. at 689. Section 1853(d) of the Act states in pertinent part: 
Any statistics submitted to the Secretary by any person in 
compliance with any requirement under subsection (a)(5) of 
this section shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed elt-
cept when required under court order . . . eltcept that . . . 
such statistics [may be disclosed] in any aggregate or summary 
form which does not directly or indirectly disclose the identity 
or business of any person who submits such statistics. 
16 U.S.C. § 1853(d) (1976). The Senate Conference Report also states (referring to § 
1853): "This section also requires that statistics ... not be released to the public in the 
form of individual records .... " S. CONF. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 
(1976). 
This section seems designed to protect the identity of the persons or businesses sub-
mitting the statistics, not to prevent the release of the information itself. However, this 
is not noted by the dissent. 
63. 645 F.2d at 689. 
64.1d. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/7
1982] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 163 
decided similar issues. In Columbia Basin Land Protection As-
sociation v. Schlesinger,811 the court declined to grant complete 
access to all raw data used in compiling an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS), requiring only that a reasonable method 
of access to the information be provided.88 In National Wildlife 
Federation v. Adams,'" the Ninth Circuit outlined a standard 
which must be met in order to set aside regulations for inade-
quate disclosure.88 The court held that disclosures must be set 
aside when they are so grossly deficient that they frustrate the 
public's right to comment.8' Here, the dissent argued that be-
cause the disclsoure was not so grossly deficient, the regulations 
were valid. '70 
Judge Poole further stated that the facts upon which the 
majority reversed summary judgment were not relevant if the 
inquiry was one of whether the Secretary complied with the 
statutorily mandated summary.'71 He noted that the required 
amount of information was reasonably available, as notice was 
given specifying who to contact for further information," and 
stated that plaintiff's failure to pursue this available avenue 
foreclosed opportunity for complaint. 'fa The dissent argued that 
the disclosure in this particular case was well within the legisla-
tive mandate. '74 
65. 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981). 
66. ld. at 595. 
67. 629 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1980). 
68. ld. at 593. 
69. ld. In National Wildlife, plaintiffs sought to enjoin construction of a federally· 
approved highway on the grounds that the draft EIS was deficient and that circulating 
such an inadequate statement frustrated the public right to comment. The court stated 
that the question of compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental 
Protection Act is a procedural one, governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.s.C. § 706(2)(D). See note 32 supra for text of § 706(2)(D). The court found that the 
effects described in the draft EIS complied with the statute and held only that when the 
disclosure is 80 grossly deficient as to frustrate the opportunity to comment will the reg· 
ulation be set aside. 629 F.2d at 593. 
70. 645 F.2d at 691. 
71. ld. at 690. 
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (1976) provides: "As soon as practicable ... the Secretary 
shall publish in the Federal Register (A) such plan ...• and (B) any regulations which 
he proposes to promulgate to implement such plan or amendment." Notice of this partie· 
ular plan had been published at 43 Fed. Reg. 15,630 (1978). 
73. 645 F.2d at 690. 
74.1d. 
9
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D. CRITIQUE 
Since the hard look doctrine was first enunciated in Greater 
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,7I courts have more closely ex-
amined agency decisions involving interests which rest upon sci-
entific judgments. '6 The lack of sufficient scientific data on re-
cord may operate as one of the danger signals indicating that the 
agency has failed to adequately examine the data upon which it 
bases its decisions. '7 
Both Portland Cement Association v. Ruckleshaus" and 
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products" extended the 
doctrine by requiring an agency to supply an adequate amount 
of information to all interested parties so that they might be 
able to scrutinize and comment upon an agency's decisions. The 
goal is not simply comment, but meaningful, intelligent com-
ment.so As noted by the Nova Scotia court, failure to disclose. 
enough information has the same effect as simply forbidding 
comment.SI 
The Ninth Circuit adopted this doctrine in Western Oil and 
Gas Association v. EPA, SI when it established its standard of 
review of administrative agencies. The court there held that 
when a substantive judgment is committed to an agency's discre-
tion, available procedural safeguards should be vigorously en-
forced. sa The Ninth Circuit continued to adhere to the doctrine 
in Washington Trollers Association when it advanced an inter-
ested party's ability to obtain a hard look at the Secretary's de-
cision by requiring that she provide not only a summary, but a 
meaningful summary. 
While the majority based its decision on congre88ional in-
tent, the dissent took a narrower view and disagreed with the 
majority's construction of the term "summary." The dissent 
75. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
76. Warner, Finamore & Bean, supra note 33, at 66. 
77. [d. at 69. 
78. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). 
79. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
SO. ld. at 252. 
81. [d. 
82. 633 F.2d S03 (9th Cir. 19SO). 
83. [d. at 813. 
10
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feared that the public had been granted carte blanche, and all 
data used in an agency decision will now be available." The dis-
sent relied on Columbia Basin Land Protection Association v. 
Schlesinger, sa a case in which the Ninth Circuit declined to 
grant complete access to all raw data used in compiling an 
agency report.11 However, in Washington Trollers, the court has 
acknowledged the dissent's fear and has clarified its position by 
noting that the agency is required to disclose only that informa-
tion which was central to the Council's decision.I ' 
The dissent also argued that under National Wildlife Fed-
eration v. Adams,11 these regulations were not so grossly defi-
cient that they frustrated the public's right to comment.18 In 
that case, however, the Ninth Circuit only outlined what would 
not be considered grossly deficient. Perhaps, sub silentio, the 
court has now determined what that standard will be: Allowing 
comment on a plan without granting access to the data used in 
its formulation may qualify as a grossly deficient disclosure. 
The dissent seems to have lost sight of two objectives of the 
Plan: (1) allowing the public, through comment and advice, to 
have a meaningful voice in the shaping of the Plan," and (2) 
assuring the use of the best scientific information available in 
the Plan.81 Without public comment, there is no guarantee that 
the Plan will respond to the changing economic and social needs 
of the communities it is to serve; without access to the informa-
tion, there is no way to determine that it is truly the best infor-
mation available. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In this decision, the Ninth Circuit has continued the appli-
cation of the hard look doctrine, maintaining a shift away from 
the presumptive validity of the decisions of administrative agen-
84. 645 F.2d at 688. 
85. 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981). 
86. Id. at 595. 
87. 645 F.2d at 686 n.2. 
88. 629 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1980). 
89. 645 F.2d at 691. 
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(5). 1801(c)(3) (1976). See notes 19 & 26 supra for text of 
these sections. 
91. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(c)(3). 1851(a)(2) (1976). 
11
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cies. The court allows the public access to information central to 
a scientific determination in sufficient degree to enable meaning-
ful comment on that determination. It seems only equitable that 
the public be allowed to know how the agency formulates deci-
sions which will affect both the environment and the economy. 
While the majority's standard for the sufficiency of informa-
tion92 is vague and could perhaps be read to grant too much ac-
cess, as feared by the dissent, the dissent loses sight of the pur-
pose of the Act because of a semantic difficulty with the 
majority's interpetation of the word "summary." 
M. Lynn Haggerty 
II. NOTICE AND COMMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: PRESSING 
STATUTORY DEADLINES INSUFFICIENT TO 
CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Western Oil & Gas v. EPA,! the Ninth Circuit held, inter 
alia, that pressing statutory deadlines do not provide good cause 
for the Environmental Protection Agency to be excused from 
complying with the prior notice and comment requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act and that challenged attain-
ment status designations for California would remain in effect 
pending remand to the Agency to permit plaintiffs another op-
portunity to comment on the regulations. I 
92. 645 F.2d at 686. 
1. 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Schroeder, J. and Burns, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. [d. at 812·13. The Ninth Circuit also determined that it had jurisdiction to review 
the Agency's promulgation of the California designations. The court ruled that circuits 
other than the District of Columbia may hear suits that arise under enumerated sections 
of the Act within the regions they serve. And, because California did not promulgate its 
designation as nationwide in scope and because the designations constituted a "final ac· 
tion," it is reviewable. [d. at 807. 
The court declined to decide the collateral estoppel issue argued by the plaintiffs. It 
determined that traditionally courts of appeals have permitted federal agencies to reliti· 
gate substantially identical legal issues, Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), 
and that courts of appeals are not bound by the decisions of other environmental cases, 
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/7
1982] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 167 
The Clean Air Act (the Act)8 requires the Agency and state 
governments to formUlate air quality standards.· In Western Oil 
427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 
(1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975). 
The court also distinguished an earlier decision which appears to contradict the pre-
sent result. In United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980), the 
court held that the Agency was estopped from relitigating certain issues. The Western 
Oil court noted that t:le instant case differed because Rayonier arose from slightly differ-
ent facts. In Rayonier, the Agency filed an enforcement action under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), against a pulp mill. The 
FWPCA gave state agencies authority to administer the terms of the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (Id. § 1342). The court rejected Rayonier's argument that 
there was an "agency relationship" between the Agency and the state "such that the 
latter's action in issuing or denying a permit could be deemed the action of the 
[Agency)." 627 F.2d at 1003 (citation omitted). The appellate court saw no need to find a 
"strict agency relationship" and that the relationship betw~en the Agency and the Wash-
ington Department of Ecology was "sufficiently 'close' under the circumstances to pre-
clude relitigation of the issue already resolved in the state court." Id. 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977). 
4. The Clean Air Act has a relatively long history in the United States. Due to the 
increasing air pollution which accompanied the unprecedented industrial growth during 
World War II, Congress enacted its first federal law to reduce air pollution in 1955. Act 
of Jul. 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322. Eight years later, Congress enacted the 
Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857-
1857g (1958», in which Congress gave the federal government a broader role in handling 
air pollution problems. The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857-18571 (1964», gave the Secretary of HEW authority to issue 
mandatory air quality criteria and "placed greater emphasis on federal regulatory con-
trols and deempbasized local controls to some extent ..•. " F. GRAD, TREATlSB ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW, § 2.03, at 2-53 (1980). 
The present air quality regulatory scheme is based on the adoption of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-804, 84 Stat. 1676 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1857-18571 (1964», which provide a division of roles between the state and federal gov-
ernments. These 1970 amendments were in turn substantially amended by the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (Supp. I 1977», "to reftect compromises and occasionally some slight retreats in 
instances where the efforts at technology forcing the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments 
were not fully successful and adjustments of target dates and standards were seen as 
useful if not required." F. GRAD, supra, § 2.05, at 294. 
The states' duties regarding the formulation of air quality standards are based on 42 
U.S.C. § 7407 (Supp. II 1978) which provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Each state shall have primary responsibility for assur-
ing air quality within the entire geographic area comprising 
such State by submitting an implementation plan for such 
State which will specify the manner in which national primary 
and secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved 
and maintained within each air quality control region in Buch 
State. 
(b) For purposes of developing and carrying out imple-
mentation plans under section 7410 of this title-
(2) the portion of such State which is not part of any·such 
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& Gas, plaintiffs alleged that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (the Agency) failed to follow proper rulemaking proce-
dure& when the Agency promulgated the list of air quality at-
tainment status designations required by the Act.1I Plaintiffs ar-
gued that after various states submitted their proposed 
designations to the Agency, the Agency failed to notify the pub-
lic in advance to allow it an opportunity to comment on the pro-
posed designations as required by section 553 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (the Procedure Act).' In addition, the Agency 
missed its mandated deadlines for publishing proposed attain-
ment status designations (February 3, 1978),' and for publishing 
the actual designations and soliciting comments on them (March 
3, 1978).9 Plaintiffs filed a timely petition to the Ninth Circuit 
challenging the Agency's failure to follow rulemaking procedure, 
and submitted comments to the Agency objecting to the 
designations. 10 
On September 1, 1978, the Agency announced that it would 
accept additional public comments.U At that time, plaintiffs 
designated region shall be an air quality control region, but 
such portion may be subdivided by the State into two or more 
air quality control regions . . . . 
5. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976), defines which fed-
eral agencies are subject to review by another agency and defines agency "rulemaking" as 
the process for formulating, amending, or repealing any rule made by the agency. Id. § 
553. In addition, the Act requires that each applicable agency make all rulemaking avail-
able in the Federal Register. Id. § 552(a)(I). The federal district courts have jurisdiction 
to enjoin an agency from withholding agency records. Id. § 552(a)(4)(8). 
"Agency" is defined as "each authority of the Government of the United States, 
whether or not it is subject to review by another agency," excluding such authorities as 
Congress, the courts of the United States, the military and its courts, the governments of 
the District of Columbia and the territories and possessions of the United States. Id. § 
551. 
The Clean Air Act also indicates that "(tJhe issuance of air quality criteria and in-
formation on air pollution control techniques shall be announced in the Federal Register 
and copies shall be made available to the general public." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(d) (Supp. II 
1978). 
6. 633 F.2d at 805. Regions that comply with air quality standard requirements are 
called attainment areas. Nonattainment areas are those not complying and include areas 
which are unclassifiable due to incomplete information. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d)(I), 
7502(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978). 
7. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (Supp. II 1978). 
9. 40 C.F.R. §§ 81.300-.356 (1978). 
10. 633 F.2d at 806. 
11. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,101 (1978). 
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again communicated their objections to the Agency.1I Revised 
attainment standards appeared in the Federal Register 011 
March 19, 1979.18 Plaintiffs, still dissatisfied, filed a successful 
motion for review.14 Contrary to remedies sought by plaintiffs in 
other clean air suits in which plaintiffs had asked that the ex-
isting designations be declared invalid, 111 in this case, the plain-
tiffs suggested the entire process of preparing the designations 
be repeated strictly in accordance with state and federal proce-
dure, and that the Agency be ordered to substitute the new des-
ignations for the present ones. II 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Act required states to submit lists of attainment status 
designations for regions which achieved or failed to meet air 
quality standards by December 5, 1977.17 The designations sub-
mitted are the first step in the development of a state imple-
mentation plan (a Plan).·' The Act required the Agency to pro-
. mulgate the states' proposed attainment status designations by 
February 3, 1978, with any modifications the Agency deemed 
necessary following their review.·· States were then to use these 
designations to prepare a Plan by January 1, 1979, which, upon 
approval by the Agency, would become enforceable federal regu-
lations. These regulations would require all new and existing in-
dustry to . comply with the pollution reduction standards.to 
Section 553(b) of the Procedure Act provides an exception 
to the notice requirement "when an agency for good cause finds 
12. 633 F.2d at 806. 
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,388·91 (1979). 
14. 633 F.2d at 806. 
15. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Republic Steel Corp. v. 
Coatle, 621 F.2d 797. (6th Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980); Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 
207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
16. 633 F.2d at 814·15. 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
18. 1d. § 7502(a)(I). This section requires the states to designate 88 "nonattainment 
areas" any regions within their borders not achieving air quality standards within the 
specified time, and to submit to the Agency a listing of any nonattaining regions. It is 
through these state submissions that each state eventually must bring itself into compli· 
anCe with the Act. 
19. Pub. L. No. 95·95, 91 Stat. 685 (1971). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(2) (Supp. II 1978). 
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(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons 
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure 
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public 
interest. "21 
Circuit courts have considered the effect of the Agency's 
failure to follow section 553(b) rule making procedures on the 
promulgation of the Act's air quality attainment designations. 
For example, in United States Steel Corp. v. EPA (U.S. Steel 
l),n plaintiffs challenged a list of attainment area designations 
which the agency ruled did not meet national air quality stan-
dards. The Seventh Circuit held that the Agency had good cause 
to forego the section 553 rulemaking requirements based on im-
practicality and urgency/" and, that even if the agency did not 
have good cause for exemption, the Act precluded the court 
from reversing' the designations." The court approved the good 
cause exception because "certainly such urgency exists in this 
case where any delay in the [Agency's] designation would run 
the risk of delaying the formulation of state implementation 
plans and the consequent health detriment of delayed 
nonattainment. ''III 
Similarly, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle,·' the Sixth Cir-
cuit determined that the Agency Administrator had acted con-
sistently with the Procedure Act's good cause exception to the 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published 
in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are 
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual 
notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall 
include-
(1) a statement of time, place, and nature of public rule 
making proceedings; 
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed; and 
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved. 
22. 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. denied, 445 U.S. 
939 (1980). 
23. rd. at 289. 
24. rd. at 290. The U.S. Steelr court also noted that where a monitored area indi-
cated excessive pollution, the AgencY's nonattainment designation could be properly es-
tablished. rd. at 293. 
25. rd. 
26. 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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prior notice and public procedure requirement.27 In that case, 
plaintiffs attacked rules promulgated by the Agency for areas in 
Ohio. The court found that Congress' mandatory attainment 
dates for national air quality standards allowed the Agency to 
ignore the usual notice and comment procedures.28 
In New Jersey u. EPA,·' however, the District of Columbia 
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The 
State of New Jersey petitioned for review of an Agency-promul-
gation rule. The court ruled that the Agency failed to adhere to 
notice-and-comment requirements of the Procedure Act," and 
that the Agency's provision for post-hoc comment did not cure 
its failure to follow rule making procedure.81 The court distin-
guished New Jersey from the U.S. Steel 1 and Republic Steel 
decisions, in part, because the two latter courts' differing opin-
ions were based partly on the recalcitrance of certain corpora-
tions and states to adhere to Act requirements.8• 
Similarly, in Sharon Steel Corp. u. EPA," plaintiffs peti-
tioned for review of the Agency's final ruling that four areas of 
Pennsylvania failed to meet the national ambient air quality 
standards. IW The court held that the Agency had dispensed with 
proper rulemaking procedures without good cause,811 and that 
27. Id. at 803. 
28.ld. 
29. 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
30. Id. at 1045. 
31. Id. at 1049. 
32. Id. at 1044. The New Jersey court noted that both the U.S. Steel I and Repub-
lic Steel courts recognized industry and state delaY' in compliance with air quality stan-
dards. The Republic Steel court found that "[t]his is the sixth time this court has con-
sidered Ohio industry petitions for relief from the efforts of the [Agency] to move toward 
reductions of SO. pollution of the ambient air which Ohioans breathe." 621 F.2d at 799. 
The U.S. Steel I court noted that the development of the formalized plans for establish-
ing air quality standards "were in response to the failure of the states to meet prior 
attainment deadlines and represents Congressional concern over the seriously adverse 
health consequences of continued nonattainment." 605 F.2d at 287. The U.S. Steel I 
court also cited considerable legislative testimony to support the contention that plain-
tiffs were not in compliance after a five-year period of time. Id. at 287-88 n.5 (citing H.R. 
REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 210-11 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1077, 1289». 
33. 597 F.2d 377 (3rd Cir. 1979). 
34. Id. at 378. 
35. Id. The Procedure Act provides for two good cause exceptions from rulemaking 
requirements. Subsection 553(b)(B) allows an agency to dispense with publishing notice 
of a proposed rule and opportunity to comment "when the agency for good cause finds 
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the Agency must forebear from applying any sanctions to com-
panies in the non attainment areas until it gave statutory notice 
to the companies and held a limited legislative hearing.8s Al-
though the Sharon Steel court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, it 
chose to leave the challenged rule in effect except as to the spe-
cific designations contested in the case." 
In United States Steel Corp. v. EPA (U.S. Steel Il),88 
plaintiffs petitioned for review of the Agency's designation of ar-
eas in Alabama as nonattainment areas. The court ruled that 
since the Agency failed to follow the Procedure Act's notice re-
quirement, the designations must be set aside and the case re-
manded to the Agency.all 
C. THE COURr's REASONING 
The Procedure Act Issue 
In its consideration of the Procedure Act, the Ninth Circuit 
cited other circuits40 to hold that the "good cause" exceptions to 
section 55341 did not apply and that the Agency failed to provide 
proper notice and comment for plaintiffs to respond to the Act 
designations.42 The court rejected the Agency's argument that 
[and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules is-
sued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or con-
trary to public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1976). Subsection 553(d)(3) dispenses 
with the 30-day period for notice and comment "for good cauae found and published (by 
the agency) with the rule." rd. § 553(d)(3). 
The legislative history of the Procedure Act briefly described good cause. " 'Imprac-
ticable' refers to situations where execution of the agency's functions unavoidably would 
prevent adherence to normal rulemaking procedures. 'Unnecessary' refers to a minor or 
merely technical amendment which is not a matter of public interest." Comment, The 
Good Cause Exemptions from Administrative Rulemaking Req.uirements: Divergent 
Views in the Clean Air Cases, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 624, 625 (1980). The author of the 
Comment also noted that the § 553(d)(3) exception operates "when unavoidable time 
limits exist, when the rule is designed to correct a demonstrably urgent situation and 
when those regulated may act in anticipation of the regulation." rd. 
36. 597 F.2d at 381-82. 
37. rd. at 381. 
38. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
39. rd. at 210. The U.S. Steel 11 court remanded "to the agency so that it could 
repromulgate the Alabama nonattainment list after proper public notice and an opportu-
nity to comment." rd. 
40. See cases cited note 15 supra. 
41. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). For a discussion of the "good cause" exceptions, see note 
35 supra and accompanying text. 
42. 633 F.2d at 813. 
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statutory deadlines were so pressing as to justify use of the 
emergency procedure.·8 
The Agency argued that due to the immediate need to pro-
tect public health and the statutory deadlines established. by the 
Act," it could alternatively invoke a second exception provided 
by section 553(d)(3).411 The Ninth Circuit disagreed because 
"[b]efore that exception becomes relevant ... the agency must 
first justify abandoning the requirement of prior notice and 
comment pursuant to subsection (b)(B)."·8 Thus, since the 
Agency had not justified abandoning the subsection (b)(B) re-
43. Id. The Agency's argument that pressing statutory deadlines justified the emer-
gency procedure is clearly illustrated in its notice published March 3, 1978 in the Federal 
Register: 
Congress has acknowledged [the urgency of the deadlines) by 
imposing a tight schedule on the designation process and re-
quiring [the Agency) to promulgate the list within 180 days of 
the enactment of the amendments. Under these circumstances 
it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest 
to ignore the statutory schedule and postpone publishing 
these regulations until notice and comment can be effectuated 
43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978), quoted in 633 F.2d at 805. 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. II 1978) givea the statutory deadlines: 
(a)(l) The Administrator-
(A) within 30 days after December 31, 1970 [the 
date of enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970), shall publish proposed regulations prescribing a 
national primary ambient air quality standard and a 
national secondary ambient air quality standard for 
each air pollutant for which air quality criteria have 
been issued prior to such date; and 
(B) after a reasonable time for interested penona 
to submit written comments thereon (but no later than 
90 days after the initial publication of such proposed 
standards) shall by regulation promulgate such pro-
posed national primary and secondary ambient air 
quality standards with such modifications as he deems 
appropriate. 
(2) With respect to any air pollutant for which air quality 
criteria are issued after December 31, 1970, the Administrator 
shall publish, simultaneously with the issuance of such criteria 
and information, proposed national primary and secondary 
ambient air quality standards for any such pollutant. The pro-
cedure provided for in paragraph (l)(B) of this subsection 
shall apply to the promulgation of such standards. 
45. 633 F.2d at 811. See note 35 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of 
§ 553(d)(3). 
46. 633 F.2d at 812. 
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quirement of prior notice and comment, it could not avail itself 
of the 553(d)(3) exception either.47 
In .addition, the Ninth Circuit ac~nowledged that the "good 
cause" exception should be applied sparingly,48 and dismissed 
the Agency's argument for a "blanket exemption for agencies 
operating under pressure of statutory deadlines" because 
"[s]uch interpretation of 'good cause' would amount to judicial 
legislation. The urgency of the problem to be remedied does not 
justify the repeal by this court of the notice and comment re-
quirement."48 The Western Oil & Gas court further agreed with 
the court in Sharon Steel Corp. u. EPADO that the Agency's ac-
tions were unlikely to assure better, more timely planning or 
scheduling for the states, and that the Agency had had adequate 
time within which to make the process work.Dl 
The panel's analysis of the Procedure Act, though less thor-
ough than those of some of the courts in earlier decisions, main-
tained a consistently strict standard concerning exemptions 
from Procedure Act rulemaking requirements.DJ The court's con-
servative interpretation of the exemption subsections is consis-
tent with that of two other circuits.DB 
47.Id. 
48. Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health, Educ. and Wel-
fare, 449 F.2d 456, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1971), is the only case where the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the "good cause" exception, and then only because good cause was "evident." Id. 
49. 633 F.2d at 812. 
50. 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979). 
51. 633 F.2d at 812. 
52. See note 48 supra and accompanying text for the only Ninth Circuit decision 
which applied the "good cause" exception. 
53. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. 
EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). Both of those circuits ruled that § 553(d) requires 
that publication or service of a substantive rule "shall be made not less than 30 days 
before its effective date." In declaring the proposed designations immediately effective, 
the Agency failed to properly follow required procedure. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (1976). 
At least two commentators as well as legislative history support the Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation of the exceptions. "The exemptions from the required procedure of § 553 
are too extensive. Because of the exemptions, more rulemaking is done without notice 
and comment procedure than with it. Some exemptions are needed, but the exemptions 
can ~ drastically scaled down." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 630, at 593 
(1978). Another author states: "The APA rule-making requirements are weakened by 
exceptions which free a large part of federal rulemaking from the requirements . . . . 
These exceptions are too broad." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 61 (1976). A Sen-
ate Committee Report notes: "The exemption of situations of emergency or necessity is 
not an 'escape clause' in the sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms 
or the facts. A true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or emergency must 
20
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The Western Oil & Gas panel disagreed with the Seventh 
Circuit's broad reading of subsections 553(d)(3) and 553(b)(B). 
In U.S. Steel 1,114 the Seventh Circuit acknowledged two alterna-
tive requirements.DII The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, 
would allow the subsection 553(b)(B) exceptions only if the 
agency showed good cause why it should be excused from the 
notice and comment requirements." In any event, the subsec-
tion 553(d) requirements remained in effect.1I7 Consequently, the 
Agency made no showing of good cause, since neither exemption 
was appropriate. 
The Remedy Issue 
Plaintiffs based their remedy argument on several Supreme 
Court decisions.Ds They urged the court to invalidate the existing 
designations, to order the entire process of preparing designa-
tions repeated "in accordance with state and federal procedure, 
and [to order the Agency] . . . to substitute the resulting new 
designations for the present ones when the process is com-
plete."DI The Agency, however, urged that the plaintiffs suffered 
no actual damage even if the Agency did violate the Procedure· 
Act. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Agency's view, but substan-
tially modified the result plaintiffs requested." Though the 
be made and published." SENA,.. JUDICIARY COMMITTD RaI'ORT, S. Doc. No. 248, 200. 
54. See U.S. Steel I, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. 
denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980). 
55. Id. at 286. For the two requirements enunciated in U.S. Steel I, see note 35 
supra. 
56. 633 F.2d at S12. At least one commentator agrees with the Ninth Circuit inter-
pretation of the exemptions. K. DAVIS, supra note 53, II 6:29 to :31, at 588-99, urges the 
scaling down of the present § 553 exemptions. Davill suggests that of the seven clauses 
provided in the section, all but two-II 553(b)(B) and (d)(3)-should be eliminated. He 
suggests there is a substantial difference in these two subsections and that they should 
be retained and clarified. No mention is made of the alternative use of the subsections as 
rulemaking exemptions. 
57. Subsection 553(d) requires that publication or service of a substantive rule 
"shall be made not le88 than 30 days before its effective date." 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976). 
In declaring the proposed designations immediately effective, the Agency failed to prop-
erly follow required procedure. 
58. Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980); Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). These cases concur with the view noted in 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. at 313, that "regulations subject to the [Procedure 
Act) cannot be afforded the 'force and effect of law' if not promulgated pursuant to the 
statutory procedural minimum found in [the Procedure Act)." 
59. 633 F.2d at 812. 
60. Id. at 812-13. 
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court supported the theory that "procedural safeguards that as-
sure the public access to the decision maker should be vigorously 
enforced,"el it was reluctant to thwart "in an unnecessary way 
the operation of the Clean Air Act in the State of California dur-
ing the time the deliberative process is reenacted. "ell The court 
instead allowed the designations to remain in force but required 
that the matter be remanded to the Agency Administrator to be 
filed for timely review,ea and allowed a period of time for com-
ment on the California designations, with any revisions to be 
substituted for existing designations.84 
The court noted that several other circuits have chosen 
more conservative methods to balance the goals of the Clean Air 
Act with those of the Procedure Act.n The Ninth Circuit dis-
cussed these alternative views, considered the needs of both the 
61. Id. at 813. 
62.Id. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. I 1977) describes the requirements for administrative 
proceedings and judicial review in substantial detail. Subsection 7607(d)(9) notes: 
(9) In the case of review of any action of the Administra-
tor to which this subsection applies, the court may reverse any 
such action found to be-
(D) without observance of procedure required by law, if 
(i) such failure to observe such procedure is arbitrary or capri-
cious, (ii) the requirement of paragraph (7)(B) haa been met, 
and (iii) the condition of the last sentence of paragraph (8) is 
met. 
The last sentence of § 7607(d)(8) of the Act, in turn, provides: 
In reviewing alleged procedural errors, the court may invali-
date the rule only if the errors were so serious and related to 
matters of such central relevance to the rule that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the rule would have been signifi-
cantly changed if such errors had not been made. 
Id. § 7607(d)(8). 
64. 633 F.2d at 813. In addition, the plaintiffs also requested the Ninth Circuit to 
review the California procedures used in developing the attainment status designations 
submitted to the Agency. However, the court's study of applicable code sections of the 
Act revealed no specific procedural responsibilities and no express authority given to the 
Agency Administrator to review procedures used for compliance with state law. Further-
more, Congress specifically imposed procedural responsibilities on states and did not re-
quire the Agency to review the procedures actually used for compliance with state law. 
Consequently, the court ruled that state law must provide any remedy the plaintiffs seek 
in this regard. Id. at 813-14. 
65. The New Jersey, U.S. Steel 11 and Sharon Steel courts left all but the chal-
lenged designations in effect. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d at 1050; U.S. Steel II, 595 
F.2d at 215; Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d at 381. The Sharon Steel court also 
provided for a limited legislative hearing giving statutory notice and opportunity to com-
ment. 597 F.2d at 382. 
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Procedure Act and the Clean Air Act and chose to combine 
these important procedural and health needs." It noted that 
U[o)rdinarily a failure to comply with the [Procedure Act) re-
quirements of prior notice and comment would invalidate such 
designations. We are reluctant to so hold under the circum-
stances of this case. "''7 The court further stated that "[o)ur in-
tervention into the process of environmental regulation, a pro-
cess of great complexity, should be accomplished with as little 
intrusiveness as feasible."68 While the court referred to little leg-
islative history in making its determination, it appeared to con-
sider the need to maintain strict controls over governmental 
agencies by requiring them to follow the rule making process laid 
out in the Procedure Act as well as to give individuals adequate 
notice of rulemaking and a chance to comment on those rules." 
D. CRmQUE 
The Ninth Circuit chose a very liberal remedy under the 
circumstances of the case. The Fifth Circuit, in U.S. Steel 11,'70 
perceptively noted: "Section 553 is designed to ensure that af-
fected parties have an opportunity to participate in and infiu-
ence agency decision making at an early stage, when the agency 
is more likely to give real consideration to alternative ideas.'''Jl If 
the challenged designations are to remain in effect, as the Ninth 
Circuit held, even though notice and comment will eventually be 
allowed, plaintiffs may not actually have much influence upon 
Agency decision-making with regard to the designations. One 
can only hope that the Agency will actually acknowledge the 
comments of plaintiffs during the section 553 period. The Ninth 
Circuit failed to address this issue in its decision, and, since its 
remedy did not provide for assuring that proper procedure is 
carried out at the initiation of rulemaking procedure, there ap-
pears to be a serious flaw in the remedy. 
It seems the Ninth Circuit's major motive for maintaining 
the designations was to protect the goals of the Act from being 
undermined. This worthy goal is one which both the Seventh 
66. 633 F.2d at 813. 
67. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
68.ld. 
69.ld. 
70. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
71. Id. at 214. 
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and Sixth Circuits'lll determined was of greater value than the 
rulemaking requirements. 
One commentator has enthusiastically supported the deci-
sion that the Agency Administrator had "good cause" to forego 
the Procedure Act requirements although "fairness to the peti-
tioners required that they be afforded some opportunity to par-
ticipate in the Administrator's" decision.'1I This analyst convinc-
ingly argues that air quality standards are of. sufficient 
importance to human health and safety that the regulations es-
tablishing the standards must be put into effect as quickly as 
possible. The Ninth Circuit followed this basic philosophy by al-
lowing the plaintiffs some opportunity to participate in the Ad-
ministrator's decision. '14 The substance of that opportunity may 
be more apparent than real. If parties are not allowed to partici-
pate in the decision-making process prior to the decision, their 
comments and objections will have little if any real effect on ad-
ministrative decisions already determined. 
The court took a chance by allowing the compromise result. 
It diluted its previously consistent philosophy of seldom al-
lowing the "good cause" exception by now giving the Agency 
considerable manipulative control over the final designations 
without requiring reconsideration of the attainment designa-
tions. Several circuit courts, 'III on the other hand, have weighed 
the Agency's Procedure Act violations very differently. As the 
Sharon Steel court pointed out, the Agency Administrator origi-
nally had adequate time to review the proposed designations of 
the states: "The [Agency] Administrator should have been able 
to publish the Pennsylvania designations within ten days after 
December 6, 1977 [the states' submission deadline], offering 
them not as a final rule but as a proposed rule,''''' It can be ar-
gued that the Agency's failure to proceed immediately with its 
review of the state submissions and to publish them at least on a 
"proposed" basis was a serious mistake, and, by excusing the 
72. Republic Steel v. C08tle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1980); u.s. Steel I, 605 F.2d 283 
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, reh. denied, 445 U.S. 939 (1980). 
73. See Comment, supra note 35, at 635. 
74. 633 F.2d at 813. 
75. New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980)i Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 
597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); U.S. Steel II, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
76. 597 F.2d at 380. 
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Agency's administrative inadequacies, questions the integrity of 
the Procedure Act. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Procedure Act is meant to protect individuals from 
governmental agency abuse by providing a method whereby 
timely outside input and comment can influence rulemaking.77 
In an effort to balance this administrative goal with the health 
requirements of the Act, the Ninth Circuit has chosen a basi-
cally sound remedy. However, the panel failed to observe that 
not requiring the Agency to fulfill its rulemaking obligations 
from the outset may make late input by outside sources totally 
ineffective. The decision was a difficult one. Although protecting 
public health is extremely important, so is safeguarding the Pro-
cedure Act requirements. The Ninth Circuit's attempt to bal-
ance both, however, may have set an extremely lax standard for 
Procedure Act rulemaking which could be troublesome if not 
carefully monitored. 
Cherie P. Shanteau· 
III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 
In other cases within this Survey period, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on the degree of commitment by a utility company to de-
termine when a project "commenced construction" for purposes 
of pollution limitations, narrowly construed what constitutes a 
"public hearing," and rejected the receiving water quality test as 
a basis for granting a variance. 
A. TIMING OF "COMMENCED CONSTRUCTION" 
In two decisions, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the criteria 
which determine when a project will be deemed to have "com-
menced construction." Depending on the date of commence-
ment, different air pollution standards apply. In Northern 
77. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at § 61. 
• Second-year student, University of San Francisco School of Law. 
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Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 1 the Ninth Circuit found a 
contract for the purchase of two steam generators coupled with 
the construction of a boiler apparatus constituted commence-
ment of construction. In Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. EPA,· the 
Ninth Circuit upheld an Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) decision that mere planning or design work is not suffi-
cient commencement within the meaning of the regulations. 
In Northern Plains, a consortium headed by the Montana 
Power Company (the Power Company) contracted to build four 
coal fired, electrical generating plants in Colstrip, Montana. a In 
1974, while two plants were under construction, the Power Com-
pany contracted for steam generators for the other two plants.· 
The Power Company completed the first two plants by 1976 but 
encountered delays in obtaining permits for the remaining 
plants. The Power Company contested an EPA requirement for 
a "prevention of significant deterioration of air quality" (PSD) 
permit.' The Ninth Circuit initially upheld this requirement' 
and the Power Company proceeded with its application for the 
permit. The EPA at first denied the permit, but subsequently 
reversed its position.' 
In Sierra Pacific, two companies joined in constructing a 
two unit coal-fired electric power plant in Humboldt County, 
Nevada. The EPA found Sierra Pacific had commenced con-
struction of only one of the two units prjor to a September 19, 
1978 cutoff date. Consequently, the EPA held the second unit to 
more stringent air pollution requirements.' 
Both cases focus on the definition of "commenced" in order 
1. 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Nelson, J.; the other panel members were Tang 
and Schroeder, J.J.). 
2. 647 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Boochever, J.; the other panel members were 
Duniway, J. and Taylor, D.J., sitting by designation). 
3. 645 F.2d at 1351. The consortium included Pacific Power & Light Company, 
Portland General Electric Company, Puget Sound & Light Company, and Washington 
Water Power Company. 
4.ld. 
5. See Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683, 687 (D. Mont. 1977). In 1974, 
the EPA required PSD pe~its for sources which were commenced on or after June I, 
1975. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974). 
6. See Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1979). 
7. 645 F.2d at 1352. 
8. 647 F.2d at 62. 
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to determine the applicable standards. EPA regulations define 
"commenced" as that point in time when "an owner or operator 
has undertaken a continuous program of construction or modifi-
cation or. . . entered into a contractual obligation to undertake 
and complete, within a reasonable time, a continuous program of 
construction or modification.'" The Northern Plains court 
adopted this definition of "commenced" by rejecting a more 
stringent interpretation;lO the Sierra Pacific court faced no such 
hurdle in adopting the same definition.ll 
Applying the common definition to its facts, the Northern 
Plains court found commencement prior to the cutoff date. The 
Sierra Pacific court, however, came to the opposite conclusion. 
Critical to both decisions was the degree of commitment made 
by the companies. In Northern Plains, the purchase of steam 
generators and a boiler met the test while the planning and de-
signs of the company in Sierra Pacific did not. 
In these two cases, the Ninth Circuit developed guidelines 
for future decisions. When a change in regulations is anticipated, 
a company which enters into binding contracts to purchase or 
construct major components for its project prior to the cutoff 
date will enjoy the luxury of meeting the less stringent 
requirements. 
B. A'ITEMPTING TO DEFINE "PUBLIC HEARING" 
In Amvac Chemical Corp. v. EPA,lJ the Ninth Circuit held 
that the EPA's decision not to hold a public hearing is not re-
viewable by the court of appeals as an "order issued by the Ad-
ministrator following a public hearing." Petitioner, Amvac 
Chemical Corporation (AMV AC), manufactures dibro-
mochloropropane (DBCP), an insecticide used to control nema-
todes. AMV AC is required to register DBCP under the Federal 
9. 40 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1980). 
10. 645 F.2d at 1353·54. The Council argued that under 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(A) 
(1976), the Power Company must, in addition to the requirement of C.F.R. § 60.2, obtain 
all required approvals or permits. 645 F.2d at 1354. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu· 
ment because § 7479 itself limited its applicability to a specific portion of the Clean Air 
Act. That portion did not apply to the Power Company. [d. at 1354·56. 
11. 647 F.2d at 66·67. 
12. 653 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Price, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Ferguson, J., and Goodwin, J., dissenting). 
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Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).13 The EPA 
administers FIFRA and carries out its statutes and regulations. 
In September and October 1977, EPA issued several notices 
and orders indicating an intent to ban the use of DBCP prod-
ucts.14 Although none of the notices or orders were preceded by 
public or private hearings, EPA did invite interested parties to 
submit information concerning DBCP. In September 1978, EPA 
proposed an unconditional ban on the use of DBCP on twenty-
three specified food crops. AMV AC requested a hearing but ini-
tially objected only to the ban on one crop. AMV AC unsuccess-
fully sought leave to amend its request to include the other 
twenty-two crops. AMVAC then petitioned for review in both 
the district court and the court of appeals. EPA filed a motion 
to dismiss the district court action. This motion was denied and 
EPA appealed.' Both appeals were consolidated. 
Section 16(b) of FIFRA provides for review by the court of 
appeals of "cases of actual controversy as to the validity of any 
order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing."lll 
The critical issue, then, was the definition of "public hearing." 
In finding no "public hearing," the Amvac court first de-
. cided that the EPA action was merely procedural in nature and 
that Congress never intended purely procedural agency actions 
to be reviewed by the circuit courts.1e To bolster its position, the 
13. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976). 
14. On September 8, 1977, EPA issued a Notice of Intent to Suspend and Condi-
tionally Suspend Registration of Pesticide Products Containing DBCP. On September 
15, 1977, it issued a Notice of Rebuttable Presumption Againat Registration and Contin-
ued Registration of Pesticide Products Containing DBCP. On September 27, 1977, EPA 
issued a Suspension Order Unconditionally Suspending the Use of DBCP Products, and 
one month later, A Notice of Intent to Cancel the Registration or Change the Classifica-
tion of Pesticide Products Containing DBCP. 653 F.2d at 1261. 
15. Section 16(b) of FIFRA provides in part: 
In the case of actual controversy as to the validity of any 
order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing, 
any person who will be adversely a1I'eeted by such order and 
who had been a party to the proceedings may obtain judicial 
review by filing in United States court of appeals for the cir-
cuit wherein such person resides or has a place of business 
within 60 days after the entry of such order, a petition praying 
that the order be set aside in whole or in part. 
7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (1976). 
16. 653 F.2d at 1263. 
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Ninth Circuit examined cases in which a public hearing was 
found. In Louisiana v. Train,l' the Louisiana district court 
found a public hearing where notice was given, and the parties 
gave oral presentations, examined witnesses and presented other 
evidence. The import of Louisiana is that section 16(b) was ap-
plied in a situation where no formal public hearing was held. 
Another case applied section 16(b) where there was a need for 
consistency in litigation. Ie However, where the issue only in-
volves construing the statutory rules of administrative proce-
dure, the district court maintains jurisdiction. III The Amvac 
court also cited Harrison v. PPG Industries,"o in which the Su-
preme Court found a final administrative action reviewable only 
by the courts of appeal and not the district courts. The Amvac 
court distinguished Harrison, because the latter concerned a "fi-
nal" action. 
The· Ninth Circuit then distinguished a recent District of 
Columbia case, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle,1l 
on the grounds that a hearing took place and that Costle turned 
on statutory interpretation. In Costle, the parties submitted le-
gal memoranda to the Administrative Law Judge. A pre-hearing 
conference was scheduled but never held, and oral arguments 
were requested and denied. II The Costle court examined exten-
sively the statutory language, case law and legislative history of 
section 16(b)18 before concluding as a matter of judicial policy 
that circuit courts have jurisdiction to review agency actions if 
"administrative proceedings have developed an adequate re-
cord.""4 In Costle, the court found a sufficient record for circuit 
court jurisdiction. 
The Amvac court determined the Congressional intent lim-
ited circuit court jurisdiction to final decisions of the Adminis-
trator. Circuit courts must have adequate records with which to 
work. Finding an insufficient record here, the Ninth Circuit re-
fused jurisdiction and held that the district court must hear the 
17. 392 F. Supp. 564 (W.O. La. 1975). 
18. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 485 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
19. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1978). 
20. 446 U.s. 578 (1980). 
21. 631 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
22. 1d. at 926. 
23. 1d. at 927-31. 
24. 1d. at 932. 
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issue first. lUI 
Judge Goodwin dissented. Ie He argued that, under Castle, 
the Ninth Circuit should have found circuit court jurisdiction. 
The dissent found an adequate record for appellate review in 
that both parties submitted briefs and made oral presenta-
tions.I' Also, the Administrative Law Judge issued a nine-page 
opinion and the EPA Administrator affirmed the judge's opinion 
in a five-page order. Ie 
The test enunciated by the District of Columbia Circuit and 
argued and adopted by both the majority and the dissent ap-
pears to be correct. However, the majority misapplied it. The 
case came to the Ninth Circuit with briefs, an opinion and an 
administrative order.Ie Such a record should be adequate for ap-
pellate review especially since, as the dissent maintains, no fur-
ther record could be created and "[t]he district court's review 
will proceed in exactly the same manner as our review would 
proceed."ao Thus, the Amvac majority left ambiguous the issue 
of what constitutes a public hearing. 
C. RECEMNG WATER QUALITY TEST REJECTED 
In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Castle. al the Ninth Circuit 
rejected "receiving water quality" as a basis to grant variances. 
Petitioners operate bleached kraft pulp mills on the west side of 
Humbolt Bay and discharge effluent into the Pacific Ocean. In 
1976, the EPA issued effluent limitations for various types of 
bleached kraft pulp, paper and paperboard mills.8J A variance 
for these limitations will be allowed if the pollutor can show that 
it is affected by factors "fundamentally different" from those 
used in the guidelines. aa 
In 1977, the California State Water Resources Control 
25. 653 F.2d at 1265. 
26. ld. (Goodwin, J., dissenting). 
27. ld. at 1266 n.3. Both parties spoke to the judge at a pre.hearing conference. 
28.ld. 
29. ld. at 1266. 
3O.ld. 
31. 642 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Duniway, J.; the other panel members were 
Choy and Sneed, J.J.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1981). 
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 430 (1980). 
33. ld. § 430.62. 
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Board (the Board) granted variances to petitioners, subject to 
EP A approval. The Board based its decision on an expectation 
that no water quality problems would arise from the variance. 
The EPA Administrator denied the variance requests on the ba-
sis that the Board failed to find the non-water quality environ-
mental effects of adherence to the limitations "fundamentally 
different" from those projected by the EPA for the industry as a 
whole. 
The Crown Simpson panel framed the issue thus: 
"[W]hether, in insisting that a particular discharger show a 
'fundamental difference' in his plant before granting a variance, 
the agency must consider receiving water quality as a factor 
• . . . "s. The panel discovered that, although the costs of com-
pliance to the petitioner would be high, the Board never found 
the environmental effects to be "fundamentally different" for 
these companies' plants as opposed to others in the industry.sa 
Instead, the Board's opinion relied upon the quality of the re-
ceiving water to grant the variance. The Ninth Circuit found 
such "heavy reliance" on the quality of receiving water 
misplaced.18 
The Crown Simpson court focused on the recent District of 
Columbia decision, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle.17 In Weyer-
haeuser, the court examined the underlying policies and history 
of the water pollution control laws and found past efforts to con-
trol water pollution had failed when the focus was on the quality 
of receiving water.1I 
The Crown Simpson court also examined a previous Ninth 
Circuit casel9 in accord with Weyerhaeuser before holding that 
the recent Water Act shifted its focus from receiving water qual-
ity to technological control of efBuent.40 The court, therefore, af-
firmed the EPA's decision to deny the variances. 
34. 642 F.2d at 326. 
35. ld. In fact, one of petitioner's own witnesses testified that petitioner's plant did 
not differ much from other plants as far as non·water quality environmental impacts was 
concerned. ld. 
36.Id. 
37. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
38. ld. at 1042. ' 
39. Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980). 
40. 642 F.2d at 327. 
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In Crown Simpson, the Ninth Circuit recognized the chang-
ing trend of the legislature and judiciary to prevent further dete-
rioration of our valuable water resources rather than to maintain 
pollution at a minimal level. As past experiences have illus-
trated, focussing on receiving water quality defeats the purpose 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
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